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Interference With Land Access by
Parked Vehicles
Janet Eterovich*
0NE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT rights of the motorist is his
right (some say privilege) to park on the street and high-
way.1 This right is very limited, however. It is restricted by the
traffic regulations and nuisance statutes enacted and enforced in
the various states under their police power to protect the health,
safety and general welfare of their citizens.
Those most interested in the motorist's right to park are
other motorists and landowners whose property abuts on the
highways. The rights and remedies of these parties determine
the scope of this review.
Does a landowner have the right to move a car blocking his
driveway? At common law, a landowner could move it, using
reasonable force, on the theory that an obstruction in the high-
way is a nuisance. 2 But in Ohio, only the police or public of-
ficers may remove vehicles which are illegally parked such as
blocking a driveway, doubleparking or parking on a sidewalk. 3
A regulation prohibiting the blocking of a driveway is clearly
to protect the landowner's right of access to and egress from his
garage. Therefore, one might conclude that the landowner has a
right to park in front of his own driveway. Such was not the
conclusion in People of New York State v. Koenig.4 The court
said:
* B.BA., Fenn College, LL.B., Cleveland-Marshall Law School; member of
the Ohio Bar; and associated with the law firm of Fuerst, Fisher & Wein-
berg, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N. E. 2d 968 (1943); Kimmel
v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash. 2d 372, 109 P. 2d 1069 (1941); School Distr. of
McCook v. City of McCook, 163 Neb. 817, 31 N. W. 2d 227 (1957); Philips v.
City of Valparaiso, 233 Ind. 447, 120 N. E. 2d 402 (1954); Walker v. State of
Washington, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 P. 2d 331 (1956); Idaho Foster's, Inc. v.
Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P. 2d 726 (1941); State v. Douglas, 117 Vt. 425,
94 A. 2d 406 (1953); City of Columbus v. Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N. E.
2d 142 (1940).
2 People v. Propp, 172 Misc. 314, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (1939).
3 Ohio R. C., §§ 4511.68, 4511.99, 4511.67 and 4511.68; Boesch v. City of Day-
ton, 26 Ohio N. P. (n. s.) 137 (1926). Ordinances declaring illegally parked
automobiles to be public nuisances subject to being impounded by police,
held valid and constitutional in Hughes v. City of Phoenix, 64 Ariz. 331, 170
P. 2d 297 (1946); McLaurine v. City of Birmingham, 24 Ala. 414, 24 So. 2d
755 (1946).
4 17 Misc. Rep. 2d 934, 187 N. Y. S. 2d 379 (1959).
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The fundamental idea of a public street or highway is that
it is public for all purposes. If the regulation had prohibited
parking in front of a driveway by anyone except the owner
of the property containing that driveway, the exemption of
such owner from the operation of the regulation would be
ruled discriminatory and designed for the interest of a
special class and would accordingly be void.5
On the other hand, if another motorist blocks your driveway,
under what circumstances may you move the vehicle without
waiting for or calling the police? To the rugged individualists
who cannot wait for the authorities, the following cases are dedi-
cated.
The case of Hart v. Jones6 illustrates the remedy of self-help
in the extreme. Hart was a peddler who sold fruit from his
wagon on the street in front of Jones' Land Company. Jones
asked Hart to leave, and when he remained Jones became angry
and struck him. Hart sued Jones and the Company for assault
and battery. Verdict and judgment were for Hart. The court
reasoned that even if Jones, an abutting landowner, owned the
fee in the street and if Hart was a trespasser on his land, then
he still had the burden of showing that he used no more force
than was reasonably necessary in removing Hart from his land.
Actually the court in balancing the interests of the parties found
that public peace is weightier than the right of a person to pro-
tect his private property by using force.
A more modern approach to self-help is presented in Howard
v. Deschambeault.7 Plaintiff parked his automobile in front of the
driveway to defendant's parking lot. One of defendant's patrons
desired to leave. Defendant, in moving the car away from the
driveway, drove it over a bank and into the nearby river, claim-
ing that the brakes had failed. Plaintiff sought to recover dam-
ages for conversion of his automobile. The court held there is
no conversion in removing the vehicle from the driveway when
the purpose of removal is not to exercise dominion or control
over it, but rather to remove the car to a more convenient parking
place. The court suggested that the defendant may have been
liable for negligence; however, this issue was not raised by the
plaintiff.
5 Id., at 934, 935.
6 14 Ala. 327, 70 So. 206 (1915).
7 154 Me. 383, 148 A. 2d 706 (1959).
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In Maggiore v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Service,s the
plaintiff asked a friend to help him push a truck blocking
his driveway. The truck's motor started, the switch being un-
locked, and the truck struck and injured the plaintiff. The court
found that the plaintiff and his friend were not negligent as a
matter of law, the only negligence being that of the truck driver9
The Court of Appeals of Ohio handled a similar situation in
City of Toledo v. Hammond.10 The complaining party parked her
automobile in front of her next-door neighbor's property. She
had space to park in front of her own property. Her neighbor
came home and desiring to park in front of his premises pushed
her car forward with his bumper so he could unload his pas-
sengers. No damage was done. She filed a complaint alleging
reckless operation of his vehicle under a traffic ordinance of
Toledo. On appeal, his conviction was reversed, the court wisely
8 150 So. 394 (La. App. 1933).
9 Ohio R. C., § 4549.06 provides that any person who starts the motor, shifts
gears or releases the brake of a standing motor vehicle, "with the intent to
injure said machine" is guilty of a crime. See also, 42 A. L. R. 2d Annot.,
624: "What constitutes tampering with motor vehicle or contents?" (1955).
The general rule is that if one leaves his car standing unattended in
the street temporarily without being negligent and the car is locked, if it is
set in motion by the wilful or negligent act of a third person that act is the
proximate cause of the injury resulting and the owner is not liable: Rhad
v. Duquesne Light Co., 255 Pa. 409 L. R. A. 1917D, 864, 100 Atl. 262 (1917).
However, in Ross v. Hartmen, 78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. 2d 14 (1943):
a violation of an ordinance prohibiting the leaving of a motor vehicle un-
attended with ignition switch unlocked is negligence per se and the proxi-
mate cause of injury resulting from negligent operation of one starting the
car.
The purpose of requiring motor vehicles to be locked is not to prevent
theft for the sake of owners or the police, but to promote the safety of the
public in the streets. The fact that the intermeddler's conduct was itself a
proximate cause of the harm and was probably criminal is immaterial. The
car owner created a risk of harm that a third person would act improperly.
Therefore, he is responsible for injury to the innocent victim.
In Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. 2d 166 (1941): it was
a question for the jury whether violation of statute leaving car unlocked is
negligence.
Whether owner who leaves car unattended in street is negligent to
render him liable to third person for injury by stranger is usually question
for jury. This is true whether or not car was unlocked. Tierney v. New
York Dugan Bros., 288 N. Y. 16, 41 N. E. 2d 161, 140 A. L. R. 534 (1942);
Bergman v. Williams, 173 Minn. 250, 217 N. W. 127 (1927).
Defendant may not be negligent as matter of law in some cases: Tabary
v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 142 So. 800 (La. App. 1932); Kaplan v. Shults
Bread Co., 212 App. Div. 110, 208 N. Y. S. 118 (1925).
The intervening act of the intermeddler may be held to be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury and not the negligence of the owner in leaving the
car unlocked: Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927).
10 99 Ohio App. 286, 132 N. E. 2d 766 (1953). See also Village of Strongsville
v. McPhee, 142 Ohio St. 534, 53 N. E. 2d 522 (1944).
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pointing out that the bumper on a motor vehicle is designed to
receive bumps. On the other hand, the purpose of the ordinance
is to impose a duty on all persons using a public street not to
endanger the life, limb, or property of any other person lawfully
using the street. Since there was no danger to life, limb, or
property and the complaining witness was using the court "as a
channel for the venting of personal spleen and ill-humor," the
complaint was dismissed.
Contrast this situation: One driver parks his car in illegal
proximity to another. Upon his return, he finds his bumper
mangled, the driver of the other car having attempted unsuccess-
fully to extricate himself. Is he liable for the damage? In Conn
v. Hillard," the court said he was. Since there was no reason
to anticipate the amount of force used, he must exercise reason-
able care. 12
In People v. Propp,13 a driver blocked the sidewalk in front
of defendant's tourist home for about 25 minutes. The defendant
moved the car a few feet, although she had granted permission
to park there. For moving the vehicle, the defendant was ar-
rested, convicted, and fined $10. She appealed, her defense being
that the obstruction was a private nuisance and that she had a
right to abate it. But the common law right to abate a nuisance
is abrogated by the New York Vehicle and Traffic law. The court
said:
As a matter of public policy it would be a serious incon-
venience to the public to allow interference with the parked
cars.
14
Even assuming the right to abate a nuisance, the interference to
be removed must be an unreasonable one, and a 25 minute ob-
11 82 A. 2d 368, 25 A. L. R. 2d 1220 (Mun. Ct. App. Dist. Col., 1951).
12 A person is privileged to move chattels of another for the purpose of
abating a private nuisance (as to him) if such movement is a reasonable
means of abating the nuisance and if the possessor of the chattel, on de-
mand, has failed to abate the nuisance or the actor reasonably believes that
such demand is impractical or useless. The nuisance, inter alia, may inter-
fere unreasonably with the actor's privileged use of a public highway. But
a failure to act reasonably subjects the abater to liability for the slightest
harm to the chattel.
The Restatement of Torts gives this illustration: "A parks his car on a
highway at a point which completely obstructs B's egress from his land
unto the street. B carefully pushes A's car out of the way. In so doing, a
tire is accidentally punctured. B is not liable to A for the harm done to the
tire." 1 Restatement of Torts, Sec. 264 (1934).
13 Supra note 2.
14 Id., at 88.
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struction, as in the instant case, is not an unreasonable time to
park. 15
Generally, failure to look back as one backs out of his own
driveway is not a defense. Plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's
cab, was injured when the cab stopped in front of a driveway and
the other defendant's car backed into her. Verdict was affirmed
against both defendants in Bien v. Meyers.16 It was for the jury
to decide whether the cab driver was negligent in letting her off
there and whether it was negligence on the part of the driver
to fail to look behind him as he backed out.
But a motorist who backed his car from his garage down
his private driveway where he struck plaintiff who was cranking
his truck which he had parked in the driveway while making
a delivery to the house, was held in Caplan v. Reynolds' 7 not to
be negligent as a matter of law where he testified that he saw
nothing when backing out. While the truck driver was not a
trespasser, said the court, the fact that he was in a private drive-
way was a circumstance to be considered as bearing on the de-
gree of care the motorist was required to use.' 8
A fairly safe conclusion at this point is that patience is a
15 In Decker v. Goddard, 233 N. Y. App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. S. 440 (1931),
an injunction was awarded for parking in front of a landowner's residence
for several days for 7 hours each day against the property owner's protest.
See also, Furlong v. N. Deringer, Inc., note 66 below.
16 9 N. J. Misc. 676, 155 A. 480 (1931).
17 191 Iowa 453, 182 N. W. 641 (1921).
18 Backing from a driveway without taking steps to observe and avoid
other vehicles parked in the street is negligence: Ralph J. Rimer, Inc. v.
Stanz, 122 Ind. App. 178, 101 N. E. 2d 428 (1951).
In Brown v. Babcock, 265 App. Div. 596, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 428 (1943),
a guest whose auto had been parked in her host's garage, entered her car
and backed it into the host and his parked car. She was liable for resulting
injuries where the evidence showed that she knew about the car in the
driveway but forgot it was there and never looked behind her in backing.
For a similar case, see Frye v. Elkins, 22 Tenn. App. 317, 122 S. W. 2d 827
(1938).
In the Brown case above, the host was not barred because of contribu-
tory negligence. Nor was it contributory negligence when the driver of a
parked car started to walk toward the sidewalk and was hit by the car in
front backing into her notwithstanding that she was in a "no parking zone"
since he knew her car was there and he should have looked out for her:
LeBlanc v. Jordy, 10 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 1942). See: Suddarth v. Kirkland
Daley Motor Co., 220 S. W. 699 (Mo. App. 1920).
An operator of a parked car who knows of the presence of another ve-
hicle parked close behind, but deliberately backs into it to gain space, using
force or failing to exercise care may be held liable for resulting damage or
injury even though the car behind is improperly parked: Conn v. Hillard,
supra note 11. Wilgoren v. Pelton, 266 Mass. 17, 164 N. E. 623 (1929):
whether defendant should have avoided the collision was a question of fact
for the jury.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
virtue. A recent case of first impression in New York indicates
that it pays off. An attorney and his wife, in Harnik v. Levine,19
were parked lawfully at the curb. When they returned to their
automobile, defendant had unlawfully doubleparked next to
them, and they could not move their car. Damages were awarded
for $25, on the theory of public nuisance. The "special damage"
claimed was discomfort and inconvenience.
The Harnik case was the application of the old rule to new
facts. Under the common law rule, an obstruction in the high-
way is a nuisance. But there are two types of nuisances-public
and private. A public nuisance is an offense against the state,
and is subject to abatement or indictment on the motion of the
proper governmental agency. A private person, however, has a
private remedy for damages resulting from a public nuisance
where he has suffered a "special injury" different from that of
the public in general.20
The majority approach requires that damages to a private
individual be different in kind rather than merely in degree from
those to the public.21 The minority view accepts a showing that
plaintiff suffered actual damages and does not follow the kind-
degree distinction.2 2
It is argued by the minority that unless the plaintiff is re-
quired to show actual damages, there would be liability to every-
one coming in contact with a public nuisance. If a person suf-
fers pecuniary damages, he should be compensated; but if there is
no such person, the malefactor should be punished by the public
officials. Plaintiff in the Harnik case claimed damages for dis-
comfort and inconvenience. But this is tantamount to pecuniary
damage under the minority view.
23
19 106 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (Mun. Ct. of City of N. Y., 1951).
20 Special injury rule: Huebschmann v. Grand Co., 166 Md. 615, 172 Atl. 227
(1934); Wolfe v. City of Providence, 74 R. I. 192, 74 A. 2d 843 (1950); Clinic
and Hosp. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S. W. 2d 384, 23 A. L. R. 2d
1278 (1951).
21 Davis v. Hampshire County, 153 Mass. 218, 26 N. E. 848 (1891); Kinnear
Mfg. Co. v. Beatty, 65 Ohio St. 264, 62 N. E. 341, 87 Am. St. Rep. 600 (1901);
Bacich v. Port of Control of Calif., 23 Cal. App. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 818 (1943);
Hillerege of City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N. W. 2d 76 (1957).
22 Piscataqua Nav. Co. v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co. (D. C. Mass. 1898), 89 F.
362; Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 825 (1829); Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147
N. Y. 657, 42 N. E. 341 (1895). See also Smith, Private Action for Obstruc-
tions to Public Right of Passage, 15 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1915); Case Comment,
Torts-False Imprisonment-Public Nuisance-Liability for Doubleparking, 59
Mich. L. Rev. 1122 (1952).
23 Case Comment, Torts-False Imprisonment-Public Nuisance-Liability for
Doubleparking, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1122 (1952).
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Others contend that liability should not have been imposed
for another reason. A New York statute defines a public nuisance
as a crime (a misdemeanor). In New York, doubleparking is a
violation of a traffic ordinance which is not a crime. If double-
parking is a traffic violation and not a crime, how can it be a
public nuisance? 24
Dictum in the Harnik case indicated that an action might
lie for false imprisonment, but the court did not have jurisdic-
tion. The court drew an analogy between a "captive audience"
and a "captive motorist" and concluded that if the former was
entitled to relief, so is the latter.25
It is generally stated that to constitute false imprisonment,
there must be actual and total restraint. Those who would
argue against false imprisonment in the foregoing case suggest
that false imprisonment is based on freedom of movement. In
the Harnik case, since the plaintiffs could have walked, the re-
straint was not total.26 On the other hand, proponents say free-
dom of movement means freedom of locomotion, that is, a re-
straint of plaintiffs' automobile, depriving them of practical means
of locomotion, amounts to complete restraint.
2 7
24 Comment, Doubleparking as a public nuisance, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 1067
(1951): "Prior to the Harnik decision, only where the New York legislature
designated a traffic violation a crime did the New York courts find the
offense a public nuisance. On the premise that a traffic violation should not
be treated as a crime, one New York court held that driving on the wrong
side of the road is not a public nuisance, although such driving could be
classified as an obstruction to the highway. And a private suit to abate the
maintenance of public hack stands which obstructed the streets was dis-
allowed on the ground that maintenance of the stands was a violation of a
licensing ordinance and should not be held also to be a public nuisance."
A violation of the double parking statute under Pennsylvania's Motor
Vehicle Code is negligence per se: Bricker v. Gardner, 355 Pa. 35, 48 A. 2d
209 (1946). However, the plaintiff must allege and prove proximate cause:
Marchl v. Dowling & Co., 157 Pa. Super. 91, 41 A. 2d 427 (1945).
25 W. Goldman, Liability in nuisance for doubleparking, 3 Syracuse L. Rev.
195 (1951).
26 Case Comment, Torts-False Imprisonment-Public Nuisance-Liability for
Double parking, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1122 (1952).
27 Freeman, Torts-Doubleparking as false imprisonment and nuisance, 4
Ala. L. Rev. 309-12 (1952). See, Great So. R. R. v. Denton, 239 Ala. 301, 195
So. 218 (1940); Scruggs v. Beason, 246 Ala. 405, 20 So. 2d 774 (1945). Na-
tional Bond & Invest. Co. v. Whitborn, 276 Ky. 204, 123 S. W. 2d 263 (1938):
held, the defendants who seek to repossess a car driven by plaintiff, hail him
to the curb and tow his car a short distance with him in it is false imprison-
ment even though he could have stepped out. In Cordell v. Standard Oil Co.,
131 Kan. 221, 289 P. 472 (1930): The defendant's filling station agent
drained the gasoline from plaintiff's car and commanded her to wait until
he called the police. He believed she was in collusion with thieves. This
was a false imprisonment. Griffin v. Clar, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P. 2d 297, 301
(1935): "Even a partial restraint as prevention of one's ingress and egress
from a place in a certain manner would be sufficient to constitute false im-
prisonment. The test is not the extent of the restraint but its unlawfulness."
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While a doubleparker was in a store in Newman v. Steur-
nagel,28 his guest waiting in his car moved it to afford a blocked
car exit. The guest lost control and hit plaintiff's truck in the
rear causing him injury. Plaintiff's truck was also doubleparked.
The court held that the defendant's negligence in doubleparking
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury because he could
not have foreseen that his guest would act as he did.29
For further analysis on the question of liability, we go to
sea and the English case of Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum
Co.30 The defendants' ship ran aground due to a steering defect.
The master, afraid that the vessel would break up with loss of
life and property, jettisoned the cargo of oil which floated to the
plaintiffs' shore and caused extensive damage. Although the
lower court found the master was not negligent in navigation,
the appellate court found the defendants liable under the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur.
Could the court have found a trespass in the Southport case?
The "traffic rule" as laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher31 is that
traffic on a highway exposes persons who have their property
near it to the risk of trespass, and therefore, such persons cannot
recover damages without proof of negligence. The "traffic rule"
is restricted to involuntary trespasses and does not extend to
cases like this one where the defendant acted deliberately. This
may then have been a trespass.3 2
If discharging oil into navigable waters is a public nuisance,
the plaintiffs in the Southport case may recover if they suffer a
"special damage." Under the minority view above, a showing of
pecuniary loss would seem sufficient.3 3
28 132 Cal. App. 417, 22 P. 2d 780 (1933).
29 Contrast: violation of a statute or ordinance prohibiting angle parking
is negligence per se: Pugh v. Akron-Chicago Transportation Co., 137 Ohio
St. 164, 28 N. E. 2d 501 (1940); Hataway v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc. 158 So. 408
(La. App. 1935); Telling Belle-Vernon Co. v. Wiggens, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 373
(Ohio App. 1932).
A defendant's violation of statute requiring that vehicle be parked
parallel to and within certain distance of curb is negligence: Armour & Co.
v. Yoter, 40 Ohio App. 225, 178 N. E. 596 (1931); Bartley v. Fritz, 205 Minn.
192, 285 N. W. 484 (1939); Matthews v. Mound City Cab Co. (Mo. App. 1947)
205 S. W. 2d 243; Trailer v. Schelm, 227 Iowa 780, 288 N. W. 865 (1939).
30 3 W. L. R. 773 (1953); 3 W. L. R. 200 (1954).
31 L. R. 1 Exch. 265 (1866).
32 F. H. Newark, "Trespass or Nuisance of Negligence," 17 Modem L. Rev.
579 Nov. (1954).
33 Id., at 581. But see Philadelphia Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hirschfield
Printing Co., infra note 34.
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Back on terra firma, what happens when there is damage to
a parked car? In Philadelphia Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hirsch-
field Printing Co.,3 4 the defendant's stalled truck was parked
along the curb. The driver drained gasoline from the gas tank,
into the street, which ran along the curb and under the insured's
parked car. The blaze from a match discarded by another em-
ployee lighting a cigarette followed the gasoline down the gutter
to the insured's car which was destroyed. The insurance com-
pany after paying the insured for his loss sought damages under
its right of subrogation. The court found that by spilling the
gasoline, a public nuisance was created. The duty to exercise
reasonable care was a question of fact which the trial court de-
cided in favor of the insurance company.35
Note that in the Philadelphia Fire case, the court applied
negligence rules to establish liability with no reference to the
"special injury" rule.30
In Goggin v. City of Seattle, 7 a policeman asked the owner
to remove his car from an icy street which was barricaded to
provide sledding for children. Before it could be removed, two
boys collided with it while propelling their sled downhill. One
boy was killed and the other injured. Plaintiff, their father, sued
the City on the theory that it permitted a nuisance to exist under
its ordinance which provided that any vehicle parked in a public
place over 24 hours was a nuisance. The car had been there for
3 to 5 months. The court stated:
Nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to
perform a duty, which act or omission either annoys, injures,
or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others;
offends decency, unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or
tends to obstruct, or render dangerous for passage, . . . any
34 73 Ohio App. 627, 53 N. E. 2d 827 (1943).
35 For a good analysis of the distinction between nuisance and negligence
see: Terrell v. Ala. Water Service Co., 245 Ala. 68, 15 So. 2d 729 (1943):
Negligence and nuisance are distinct torts but both require a breach of duty
owed by defendant to plaintiff. Liability for nuisance does not depend on
the question of negligence, and may exist although there is no negligence.
36 Oleck, Nuisance in a Nutshell, 5 Clev-Mar. L. R. 148, 149 (1956): "The
same conduct may be negligence and also nuisance. But negligence is a
violation of a relative duty while nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty.
Nuisance-conduct is wrongful in itself, negligence is wrongful only in fail-
ure to perform a duty owed to the injured party, though the act itself is not
wrongful. If damage is an inevitable consequence of what the defendant
does or omits, his conduct is nuisance rather than negligence; but there
must be some injury sustained, ordinarily, in order to have a right of private
action for nuisance."
37 48 Wash. 2d 894, 297 P. 2d 602 (1956).
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public . . . street or highway; or in any way renders other
persons insecure in life, or in the use of property.
38
The City was negligent in failing to have this nuisance removed,
yet the court found it was not liable, for the negligence was in
the performance of a governmental rather than a proprietary
function, for which a city is immune from liability.
39
In some cases the courts characterize the parking motorists
as trespassers. In Decker v. Goddard,40 the party became liable
in trespass to the abutting property owner. Although you may
bring an action in trespass for damage to the land you own, the
question arises as to who owns the street. At common law, the
landowner whose property abutted on a highway held title to the
fee to the center of the highway, subject to the easement of
travel.4 1 In many jurisdictions, today, however, the legal title to
the street is in the municipality or state which holds the property
in trust for the public.42
38 Id., at 603. For other statutory definitions of nuisance, see: Cal. Civ.
Code, § 3479; Burns Ind. Stats., § 2-505; and Ohio R. C. § 3767.01, note 45 be-
low.
39 Accord: Lakoduk v. Cruger, 287 P. 2d 338, 47 Wash. 2d 286 (1955);
Bradshaw v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 766, 264 P. 2d 265, 42 A. L. R. 2d
800 (1953); Sultan v. Parker-Washington Co., 117 Mo. App. 636, 93 S. W. 289
(1906); People v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 47 (2d dept.) affirmed, 216 N. Y. 658, 110 N. E. 1046 (1942). Contra:
Downey v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 189, 65 So. 2d 825 (1953).
For Ohio cases on the subject, see: Chupek v. City of Akron, 89 Ohio
App. 266, 101 N. E. 2d 245 (1951); Ware v. City of Cincinnati, 93 Ohio App.
431, 111 N. E. 2d 401 (1952); Ballinger v. City of Dayton, 95 Ohio App. 62,
117 N. E. 2d 469 (1952): municipal corporations may be held liable for the
maintenance of nuisances when they are performing a governmental func-
tion, as well as being held liable in damages for negligence when exercising
their proprietary power.
Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411, 83 N. E. 2d 389 (1948): The
duty imposed on a municipality by statute to keep its streets free from
nuisance is an exception to the common law rule that no liability attaches to
the municipality for negligence in discharge of a governmental function.
40 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1931). See also, Reynolds v.
Clarke, 1 Pitts. Rep. 9 (Pa., 1853); Lipincott v. Lasher, 44 N. J. Eq. 120, 14
Atl. 103 (1888); Lloyd, The Parking of Automobiles, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 336
(1928); 1 Restatement of Torts, Sec. 192, comment f (1934); 1 Harper and
James, The Law of Torts, Sec. 1.14, p. 43, 44 (1956).
41 Hickey v. Riley, 177 Ore. 321, 324, 162 P. 2d 371, 374 (1945); City of
Decatur v. Robertson, 251 Ala. 99, 361 So. 2d 694 (1948); Mont. Glodt v.
City of Missoula, 121 Mt. 178, 190 P. 2d 549 (1948); Chase v. City of Sanford,
212 Miss. 237, 54 So. 2d 372 (1951); Greenwood v. City of Washington, 230
Ind. 220, 102 N. E. 2d 645 (1952); Wilson v. City of Laramie, 65 Wyo. 234,
199 P. 2d 121 (1948); People ex rel. Hofimaster v. LaDuc, 329 Mich. 716, 46
N. W. 2d 442 (1951). See also, 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, Sec.
1.14, p. 43 (1956).
42 Loubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A. 2d 882 (1943); Pa.
County v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 54 N. E. 825, 53 L. R. A. 823 (1899); Hillerege
(Continued on next page)
Sept., 1960
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol9/iss3/13
LAND ACCESS AND PARKING
Lastly, the landowner has the remedy of injunction. The
rules are similar to those already revealed, but their application
is very much different.
At common law and in the majority of states, one may en-
join an obstruction caused by a parked vehicle which deprives
the landowner of his right to access causing him "special injury"
unlike that suffered by the general public. This is the general
rule today.43 The "special injury," however must be proved
whether or not a statute or ordinance has been violated.
4 4
In Ohio,4 5 a nuisance is that which is defined and declared
by statutes to be such.46  (Certain activities are declared by
(Continued from preceding page)
v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N. W. 2d 76 (1957); Cowin v. City of
Waterloo, 237 Iowa 377, 21 N. W. 2d 705 (1946); Splinter v. Nampa, 70 Idaho
331, 215 P. 2d 999 (1950).
The Ohio Constitution, Article I, § 19 declares that "roads shall be open
to the public" and while, by provisions of Ohio R. C. § 723.01, the legislature
delegates to municipalities the control and regulation of the streets within
their confines, it has in clear terms placed on them the duty to keep the
streets "open, in repair and free from nuisance."
43 Rose v. Miles, 4 M. & S. 101, 105 Eng. Rep. 773 (1815); Branahan v. Cin-
cinnati Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 333, 49 Am. Rep. 457 (1883); Brauer v. Balti-
more Refrig. & Heating Co., 99 Md. 367, 58 Atl. 21, 66 L. R. A. 403 (1904);
Flynn v. Taylor, 6 N. Y. Supp. 98, 28 N. E. 418 (1891); Hill v. Pierson, 45
Neb. 503, 63 N. E. 835 (1895); People ex rel. L'Abbe v. Distr. Ct. of Lake
County, 26 Colo. 386, 58 P. 604, 46 L. R. A. 850 (1899); Buchholz v. N. Y.
Lake Erie & W. R. R., 148 N. Y. 640, 43 N. E. 76 (1895); Cf. Manhattan
Bridge 3-Cent Line v. Third Ave. Ry., 154 App. Div. 704, 137 N. Y. Supp.
434 (2d dept., 1913).
44 Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 7 A. D. 2d 89, 18i
N. Y. S. 2d 644 (1958). The "special injury" must be shown since equity
will not enjoin a crime because of the constitutional rights of the accused
person: Oleck, Nuisance in a Nutshell, supra note 36, at 158. Also, see State
v. Ehrlich, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 691 (1909); Ohio
Rev. Code, Sec. 2767.24.
45 Under Ohio R. C. § 3767.03: Whenever a nuisance exists, the attorney
general, prosecuting attorney of the county in which such nuisance exists
or any person who is a citizen of such county may bring an action in equity
in the name of the state to abate such nuisance and to perpetually enjoin
the person maintaining the same .... (Emphasis added.) For comparative
legislation, see: Ky., K. R. S. 233.010; Mass. Ann. Laws, Ch. 139, Sec. 4;
Penn. Purdon's Stat., Title 68, Sec. 467; Tenn., Williams Code, Sec. 9324.
Under Ohio R. C. § 5589.01:
"No person shall obstruct or encumber by fences, buildings, or other-
wise, a public ground, a highway, street or alley of a municipal corpo-
ration."
To park automobiles in a street for purpose of sale is not an offense under
-this section: Fry v. State, 55 Ohio App. 264, 9 Ohio Op. 40, 9 N. E. 2d 701
(1936). Violators may be fined not more than $500 under Ohio R. C.
§ 5589.99. For comparative legislation, see: Midwest Investment Co. v.
Chariton, 248 Iowa 407, 80 N. W. 2d 906 (1957); Iowa Code, § 657.2, I. C. A.
(5) (1957).
46 Ohio R. C. § 3767.01.
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statute to be a public nuisance such as a gambling house and
houses of ill repute.47)
The landowner has special common law property rights in
the street, which include: (1) the right of reasonable access or of
ingress and egress; and (2) the right to have the street open and
unobstructed for public travel so as to benefit his adjoining prop-
erty.48
These two special property rights extend up, down and
across the street and are not limited to the front of one's lot.
49
Furthermore, these rights are available whether the fee to the
highway is in the name of the abutting landowner or not.
50
How these property rights are protected is the subject of the
following cases. They have been classified as to specific types of
landowners who are seeking to enjoin one of the following
parties: (1) Another landowner on the same highway; (2) A
competitor who is using the street to carry on the same business
as the landowner; (3) A businessman soliciting in the street, such
as a taxicab company; (4) The municipality, from installing
parking meters; and (5) Operators of entertainment establish-
ments.
(1) Another Landowner. In Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp.,5 1 the owner of a tenement house in New York
City desired to enjoin its next-door neighbor, a laundry which
permitted its trucks and automobiles to park on the public
pedestrian sidewalk in front of its building in violation of a city
traffic ordinance. Held, it was a public nuisance. The "special
damage" suffered by the hotel owner was a loss in rental of its
property because the access of pedestrians to the hotel was
47 Ohio R. C. §§ 2915.02 and 715.52.
48 Hall v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry., 85 Ohio St. 148, 97 N. E. 383 (1911);
City of Columbus v. Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N. E. 2d 142 (1940); Cleve-
land Furnace Co. v. Newbury & S. S. R. R., 86 Ohio St. 354, 99 N. E. 1123(1912); Flynn v. Taylor, 6 N. Y. Supp. 98, 28 N. E. 418 (1891); City of
Decatur v. Robinson, supra note 41; Loubach & Sons v. City of Easton,
supra note 42; Lynn v. Duckel, 139 Cal. App. 2d 792, 294 P. 2d 457 (1956);
Greenberg v. Snodgrass Co., 161 Ohio St. 351, 119 N. E. 2d 292, 49 A. L. R.
2d 974 (1954).
49 Madden v. Pa. R. R., 88 Ohio St. 649, 65 N. E. 1132 (1903); Hall v. Pitts-
burgh C. C. & St. L. Ry., supra note 48.
50 People v. Propp, supra note 2; Pa. Co. v. City of Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 54
N. E. 825 (1899); Schiable v. Lake Shore & MS R. R., 10 Ohio C. C. 334, 6
Ohio C. C. Dec. 505 (1895); People ex rel. Faulkner v. Harris, 203 Ill. 272
67 N. E. 788 (1903). But see: Furlong v. N. Deringer, Inc., infra note 58.
51 Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., supra note 44. In
Ohio, a partial obstruction seems to be sufficient: Madden v. Pa. Co., 21
Ohio C. C. R, 73 (affirmed), 66 Ohio St. 649, 65 N. E. 1132 (1902).
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partially blocked. It is not necessary to show actual pecuniary
damages. The laundry was enjoined from parking in front of
its building, but parking was allowed for reasonable periods for
the purpose of loading and unloading goods. A strong dissent felt
that a court of equity should not act as a super traffic police force
and that no real "special damage" had been shown. 2
Flynn v. Taylor58 contains a similar decision based on dif-
ferent facts. Defendant was a manufacturer of articles for do-
mestic consumption. Plaintiff operated a retail liquor store next
door. Defendant, during several hours of every day, permitted
its trucks to load and unload on the sidewalk in front of its
factory. Plaintiff claimed that the "special damage" suffered was
a decline in the rental value of his premises. The court main-
tained that the right to bring the suit did not depend on the
amount of the "special damage":
We think that in a populous city whatever unlawfully
turns the tide of travel from the sidewalk directly in front
of a retail store to the opposite side of the street is presumed
to cause special damage . . . because diversion of trade in-
evitably followed diversion of travel.54
(2) A Competitor. A close cousin to the two foregoing cases
above is Strong v. Sullivan.5  At night, defendant parked his
lunch wagon in front of the restaurant of plaintiff's tenant and
sold food to people passing by on the sidewalk. Plaintiff argued
that his "right of access" was being obstructed because customers
were going to the defendant instead of to the tenant. Held, in-
junction granted because the "special damage" was a loss of
customers.
52 Case Comment, Public Nuisance-Special Damage-extent thereof, 23
Albany L. Rev. 447 (May, 1959). (Although it was not necessary to show
actual pecuniary loss in this case, it should be noted that this specific
question has not been decided by the highest court in New York).
53 Supra note 48.
Ice wagons obstructed the sidewalk several hours every day in Brauer
v. Baltimore Refrig. and Heating Co. of Baltimore, 99 Md. 367, 58 Atl. 21, 66
L. R. A. 403 (1904). The court awarded a neighboring liquor store
operator an injunction and declared:
"How far the abutting owner may obstruct his sidewalk in front of his
premises is not to be determined by the necessities of his business but
by the public convenience and enjoyment by adjacent owners of their
property." (Page 22.)
Accord: Wood v. City of Chickasha, 125 Okla. 212, 257 P. 286 (1927).
54 Flynn v. Taylor, supra note 48, at 419.
55 180 Cal. 331, 181 P. 59, 4 A. L. R. 343 (1919). Accord: Pa. County v. City
of Chicago, supra note 42; Comm. v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 83 N. E. 415(1908); Spencer v. Mahon, 75 S. C. 232, 55 S. E. 321 (1906). Contra: Rex v.
Bartholemew, 1 K. B. (Eng.) 554, 52 So. Jo. 208, 21 Cox, C. C. 556 (1908).
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At common law this type of "nuisance" was early recognized
and redressed. The damage was in taking away customers. The
underlying policy was to keep competition free unless it was re-
stricted by the King, common law or statute.5 6 It does not seem
"right" to the courts to have a landowner pay overhead and rent
bills and yet to permit a traveling food wagon or truck which has
no rent or overhead expenses to use the street directly in front
of the landowner, obstructing his access.
57
(3) A Businessman Soliciting in the Street (not in direct
competition with a landowner). In Furlong v. N. Deringer,
Inc.,5 8 defendant operated a customs brokerage business and was
soliciting business through its agent who was parked opposite
defendant's custom house. Plaintiff owned the land on both sides
of the street where the parking took place. The car was parked
from 8 a.m. until 5 p.m. daily except week-ends. Plaintiff claimed
that defendant was using her land for the purpose of conducting
a business for private gain. The defense: her right is subject
to the easement of the public in streets to use them for reason-
56 McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U.
Fla. L. R. 27, 37 (1948). In Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 159 Fla.
629, 32 So. 2d 727, 2 A. L. R. 2d 429 (1947), a drugstore operator complained
that access to his store was being obstructed by the cafeteria owner's cus-
tomers. The cafeteria owner denied the existence of a nuisance and even
if there was one, it was not of his creation. Held, the defendant has no duty
to police the public streets and regulate their use. That responsibility rests
on public authority. But where an abutting property owner uses the side-
walk in an unreasonable manner, a public and private nuisance results. If
another abutting landowner suffers a special injury, he may have appro-
priate relief.
Dissent:
"Before there is liability, the acts done by the defendant must be the
proximate cause of the creation of the nuisance complained of ....
A person is not usually civilly liable for a nuisance caused or pro-
moted by others over whom he has no control." (Page 731.)
See also, Jacksonville, Tampa & Ky. Ry. v. Thompson, 34 Fla. 346, 16 So. 282,
26 L. R. A. 410 (1894).
57 Under Ohio R. C. § 2923.22 (Penal Code):
"No person shall set up a table, stand, tent, wagon, or other article, to
use or let for profit, on a public street . . . or obstruct . . . the material
of which it is composed."
This is punishable by fine and imprisonment. In view of this section, a city
has no authority to grant permission to use a street for private business
purposes: Rowe v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio App. 87, 159 N. E. 492 (1927); Gers-
pacher v. Cleveland, 21 Ohio Op. 537 (Common Pleas, 1941).
Loading and unloading goods from wagons standing on the sidewalk
from 3 to 40 minutes at a time from one to two hours each day and causing
pedestrians to walk in the street is a violation of this section: McCormick
Harvesting co. v. Kauffman-Lattimer Co., 5 Ohio N. P. 505, 5 Ohio Dec. 468
(1894).
58 Ill Vt. 220, 13 A. 2d 186 (1940). Accord: People ex rel. Hoffmaster v.
LaDuc, supra note 41. But see, Pa. Co. v. City of Chicago, supra note 50.
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able transportation of persons and things and dissemination of
information. Held, injunction granted. Nothing was said about
nuisance doctrine or "special injury."
Probably the bulk of cases under this category, however, in-
volve taxicab companies. One of the earliest English cases was
Rex v. Cross.5 9 There was an indictment for maintaining a com-
mon nuisance, against the owner of a stagecoach concern whose
coaches stood for unreasonably long periods ranked in two and
three tiers upon the public highways in London. Held, that every
unauthorized obstruction of the highway to the annoyance of the
public is an indictable offense.
The Ohio Supreme Court was confronted with such a prob-
lem in Branahan v. Cincinnati Hotel Company. 0 The hotel sought
an injunction and damages against the owners of hackney coaches
due to interference with free access to its storerooms rented in
the hotel building on the first floor. The coaches parked in front
of the storerooms, waiting for customers. The Court granted the
injunction since an abutting owner has a valuable "right of
access" for business purposes to the street. The coach company
argued that users of the hacks were accommodated more readily
and on better terms. The court said that the right of access is
more important. The implication was that the "special injury"
was loss in rental value and loss of customers.
(4) The Municipality from Installing Parking Meters. Plain-
tiff, in Hickey v. Riley,6 1 leased property abutting on a public
street. Parking meters were installed in front of and immediately
adjacent to his leased property. He asked that the meters be
removed and the city be enjoined from continuing their use be-
cause they interfered with his right of access to his premises by
himself and his customers. Although the court found that he suf-
59 3 Camp. Rep. (Eng.) 224, 170 Reprint 1632 (1812).
60 Supra note 43. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co. v. City of New York, 212 N. Y.
97, 105 N. E. 805 (1914): Ordinance for hack stands valid and not inter-
ference with hotel's right of ingress and egress; Red Top Cab Co. v. Mc-
Glashing, 204 Iowa 791, 213 N. W. 793 (1927); McFall v. City of St. Louis,
232 Mo. 716, 135 S. W. 51 (1911): Ordinance valid giving abutting property
owner right to grant permission to certain passenger vehicles in streets sub-
ject to mayor's approval; Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. James, 298 Mo.
497, 251 S. W. 57 (1923): Railway cannot grant monopoly in one taxicab
company by excluding other cabs from its approach even if it owns the
approach; Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, 184 Wis. 182, 199 N. W. 219, 33
A. L. R. 351 (1930): Injunction denied. If two other competing cab com-
panies did not interfere with the hotel's right of access, then defendant did
not either.
61 Supra note 41. Accord: City of Columbus v. Ward, supra note 48.
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fered a "special injury" in losing some of his customers and in
not being able to park there himself, the injunction was denied.
The court reasoned that part of the police power of the city is
the regulation and control of the use of the streets and main-
taining them in safe condition.6 2
In Kimmel v. City of Spokane,6 3 plaintiff sought to enjoin
installation of parking meters in front of his storeroom. Decree
for plaintiff was reversed on appeal. Plaintiff argued that the
parking meters were an unlawful interference with his right of
ingress and egress. He said his right of access was subservient
only to the right of the traveling public. It was not subservient
to the privilege of parking in front of his storeroom. But the
court said:
Under the exigencies and complexities of modern life, it is
impossible to guarantee to respondent free and uninterrupted
access to his premises at all times. The use of the streets and
highways for the parking of motor vehicles has been too
long and too well established by custom to now be denied
because of the theoretical right of the occupant of abutting
property to free and uninterrupted access to his premises at
all times .... It is obviously to the interest of the occupant
of abutting property that such time limits be strictly en-
forced, for the shorter the limitation and the more effectively
it is enforced, the greater is his freedom of access to his
premises. 64
Clearly, until something better comes along, the use of parking
meters is an accepted method of easing traffic congestion.
(5) Entertainment Establishments. A private nuisance suit
is a different action from one for a public nuisance. In a private
nuisance action, the interest invaded is in the use and enjoyment
of land. More specifically, the use defendant is making of his
land is interfering with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land.
The courts, in considering the operation of dance halls and
the conduct of public dances, determine whether a private
nuisance exists by giving weight to the fact that large numbers
62 In Andrews v. City of Marion, supra note 1, the plaintiff contended that
the parking meter ordinance required him and his friends to pay for park-
ing in front of his own property and therefore he was deprived of his prop-
erty without due process of law, contrary to the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. But, injunction was denied. The regulation is neces-
sary under the police power in order to keep traffic moving, to minimize
congestion in busy streets, and to fairly distribute the privilege of parking
among the members of the public using the street.
63 Supra note 1. Accord: City of Decatur v. Robinson, supra note 41.
64 Id., at 1071.
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of cars recurringly congregate, causing traffic, parking problems
and other annoyances. For example, in Barrett v. Lopez,65 an
action to abate defendant's operation of a dance hall near plain-
tiff's properties as a private nuisance was instituted in the Village
of Loving, New Mexico. The activities complained of were: (1)
the blocking of private driveways by automobiles belonging to
defendant's customers; (2) love making in the vehicles parked in
the vicinity and the disposition of evidence of the same on near-
by property; and (3) loud horn honking.
The trial court refused relief not because it did not believe
a private nuisance existed but because: (1) defendant was using
every reasonable means to keep his dance hall in reasonable
order and decorum; and (2) the police authorities should afford
plaintiffs their remedy, not the courts. This was reversed by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, which stated that, where it is
clear that a private nuisance exists, relief should be given by
the courts if the civil authorities will not take action.
Plaintiff owned a farm in Amdor v. Cooney.(" Defendant
owned an adjoining farm with a baseball diamond on it. The
diamond was across the road from plaintiff's buildings. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin as a private nuisance the use of the diamond for
baseball games. The annoyances were the parking of automobiles
in front of plaintiff's buildings on the road, blocking his access.
The court ordered the diamond to be moved to the northwest
corner of the field where the spectators then would park their
cars. The courts, in a case where a "private nuisance" is shown,
will consider and adopt alternatives.
65 57 N. Mex. 697, 262 P. 2d 981 (1953). Many activities have been held to
be nuisances, under circumstances which produced an unreasonable an-
noyance to the plaintiff, including ballparks and dance halls.
Ballparks: Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 27, 53
Ati. 289 (1902). Dance halls: Parker v. Truehart (1922, Tex. Civ. App.)
246 S. W. 267: Even a city license or permit will not prevent equity from
enjoining a nuisance; Whitcomb v. Vigeant, 240 Mass. 359, 134 N. E. 241, 19
A. L. R. 1439 (1922); To operate a dance hall without a license is a crime
and a public nuisance: Linden v. Fischer, 154 Minn. 354, 191 N. W. 901(1923); Thurman v. State, 67 S. W. 2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); A dance
hall is a public nuisance: Blanton v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 149, 259 P. 655
(1927) and Ahr v. State, 31 S. W. 657 (Tex. Crim., 1895); Phelps v. Winch,
309 Ill. 158, 140 N. E. 847, 28 A. L. R. 1169 (1923); Meadowbrook Swimming
Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 Atl. 146 (1938); Bartlett v. Moats, 120 Fla.
61, 162 So. 477 (1935); Asmann v. Master, 151 Kan. 281, 98 P. 2d 419 (1940);
Sipe v. Dale, 183 Okla. 127, 80 P. 2d 569 (1938). Also see, 1 Harper and
James, The Law of Torts, Sec. 1.25, p. 75 (1956).
66 241 Iowa 777, 43 N. W. 2d 136 (1950). But see: Galveston Comm. Ass'n
v. Ort, 13 Okla. Crim. 563, 165 S. W. 907 (1914): The construction of a
baseball park under purported municipal authority may be enjoined as
interference with abutting landowner's special property right of access.
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
Plaintiff owned a farm about .8 of a mile from a gambling
house. Business was so good that traffic backed up as far as
plaintiff's home. The motorists parked in front of and on his
premises, drank and made love. His driveway was often blocked
by parked vehicles. Inquiries by telephone and personally were
made of him as to where the "Club" is. The foregoing facts oc-
curred in the Ohio case of Widmer v. Fretti.67 At first blush, it
may appear to be a private nuisance action, but it was not so
held.68 In Ohio, a gambling house is a public nuisance per se.
Therefore, it is necessary only to prove the commission of the
act and not that the nuisance interferes with enjoyment of prop-
erty since this is conclusively presumed from the act. A perma-
nent injunction was granted because of plaintiff's proximity to
the gambling house.
In the Widmer case compensatory damages were not awarded
by the Court of Appeals of Ohio. To be liable for the alleged
damages of the trespassers requires that the defendant have di-
rection or control over them. No control was shown. The dam-
ages with respect to the telephone calls were speculative in
absence of proof that defendant instigated the calls. No loss in
rental value was proved because the house was not being rented.
67 95 Ohio App. 7, 52 Ohio Op. 343, 116 N. E. 2d 728 (1952).
Stegner v. Bahr & Ledoyen, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 2d 220, 272 P. 2d 106
(1954), (Syllabus #5): "Where operation of rock quarry caused an in-
crease in truck traffic on highway abutting plaintiff's property but it was
not shown that this traffic obstructed or interfered with plaintiff's right of
ingress or egress nor that the increased traffic unlawfully obstructed the
free passage or use in any customary manner of the highway, the increased
traffic on the highway did not furnish a basis for enjoining the quarry op-
eration."
Furthermore, the violation of a penal ordinance does not of itself create
a nuisance per se, and in the absence of special injury, an injunction will
not be granted on the application of a private individual merely to prevent
violation of a penal ordinance.
The operation of a quarry is not a nuisance per se: Morton v. Superior
Ct., 124 Cal. App. 2d 577, 269 P. 2d 81, 47 A. L. R. 2d 478 (1954).
68 A distinction is made between an absolute nuisance and a nuisance per
accidens. "In the case of a nuisance per accidens, a clear case of nuisance
and irreparable injury must be established and conflicting equities must be
weighed, but in the case of a nuisance per se, the liability is absolute and
injury to the public is presumed. If the evidence tends to show irreparable
injury to the plaintiff, separate and distinct from that suffered by the public,
by reason of the unlawful conduct, the injunction should issue." Widmer v.
Fretti, supra note 67.
Per accidens: Goodall v. Crofton, 33 Ohio St. 271, 31 Am. Rep. 535
(1877); Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51, 67 N. E. 89 (1903); Powell v. Craig,
113 Ohio St. 245, 148 N. E. 607 (1925); Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio
App. 476, 78 N. E. 2d 752 (1947); World Realty Co. v. Omaha, 113 Neb.
396, 203 N. W. 574 (1925); Green City Bd. of Comm. v. Usrey, 221 Ind. 197,
46 N. E. 2d 823 (1943); Bell v. Pollak Steel Co., 28 Ohio Dec. 50, 19 Ohio
N. P. (n.s.) 531 (1917).
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That the house could have been rented for a certain sum is
speculation.6 9
Conclusion
Tort law with respect to the parked motorist is in the early
stages of development. There is a sprinkling of legislation abat-
ing the parking of an automobile as a nuisance and providing
fines and imprisonment for various offenses under the penal
and civil codes of the various states. The realization that such
legislation exists should be a sufficient deterrent to citizens to
refrain from moving another's automobile in the streets. But
when local law enforcement agencies are slow to act or refuse
to do so, resort may be had to the courts for relief. And the
trend is definitely in this direction.
Most courts have not welcomed the trend. By juggling the
feudal concepts of property rights with the limited legislation
available today, the result is usually confusion. It is recom-
mended that the law in this area be re-evaluated so as to keep it
abreast of one of the most commonplace but vitally important
instruments of our century-the automobile.
69 Nominal damages awarded in Hazen v. Perkins, 92 Vt. 414, 105 Atl. 249
(1918); Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., supra note 44;
Bannon v. Murphy, 18 Ky. 989, 38 S. W. 889 (1897).
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